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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of a unitary patent law for the European Economic
Community (EEC) has long been considered a necessary constitu-
ent of the process of European economic integration,' a process for-
mally inaugurated by the principles of the Rome Treaty.2 As a corol-
lary, such economic integration has been postulated as a necessary
precondition for the politico-legal unification of Europe.3 The Lux-
embourg Convention on the Community Patent (CPC)l has the
capability to nurture both the process of economic integration and
the process of politico-legal unification. Not only does the CPC
foster economic integration through its creation of the Community
patent, a patent granted jointly for all member states of the EEC
by the European Patent Office in Munich5 pursuant to procedures
established by the 1973 Munich Convention on the European Patent
(EPC), but, in conjunction with the EPC, the CPC also fosters
* Attorney-Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, United States International Trade
Commission; Member of the Georgia Bar. B.A., Emory University, 1973; J.D., University of
Georgia, 1976. The opinions expressed in this article are based upon the results of the author's
research and do not constitute an official view of the United States International Trade
Commission.
' K. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 86-87 (3d ed. 1953). It should be noted at the outset
that the social utility of having a patents system in the first place will be accepted as
axiomatic throughout this article in spite of the fact that this issue is open to serious question.
See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Issac McPherson on Patents and Monopolies (Aug. 13,
1813), reprinted in JEFFERSON'S LrrrERS 290-91 (W. Whitman arranger 1950).
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, arts. 2,
3, OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrriEs, TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMuNiTIES 179-80 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty]. An unofficial
English version of the Treaty may be found in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958).
R. PRYCE, THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 27 (1962). But see Com-
ment, The EEC Patent Union and Political Integration, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 342-58
(1973).
1 Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, done Dec. 15, 1975,
reprinted in 19 0. J. Eui. COMM. (No. L 17) 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Community Patent
Convention (CPC)].
I Community Patent Convention Signed, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at
9769.
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, done Oct. 5, 1973, reprinted in 2A J.
BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 342.70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as European
Patent Convention (EPC)].
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politico-legal unification through the erection of a unitary legal re-
gime (1) for the governance of the effects of the Community patent
as a matter of substantive Community law7 and (2) for the centrali-
zation of proceedings and the concomitant application of common
procedures by the European Patent Office and the Court of Justice
of the European Communities in most actions concerning the Com-
munity patent." Hence, the CPC contains the juridical basis for the
EEC to transcend the principle of territoriality, inherent in national
patent protection of industrial property rights. In signing the CPC,
the Plenipotentiaries of the nine Member States were anxious that
the transcendence of the territoriality of national protection rights
within the EEC not only alleviate the intra-Community distortions
of competition which flow from the principle,9 but also effect the
abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods protected by
patents within the Community. 0
In order that the laudatory goals of the CPC be achieved, it is
imperative that a complete and Community-wide unification of
patent law be consummated in actuality. In the absence of
thoroughgoing unification, the present diversity of standards will
continue to develop along the lines of national patent legislation,
thereby potentially obstructing the effective governance of the Com-
munity patent by Community institutions. Consequently the goals
of the CPC and the principles of the Rome Treaty will be relegated
to the realm of hortatory expressions. It is the purpose of this dis-
quisition to determine whether or not the CPC effects the tho-
roughgoing unification of patent law necessary to achieve the EEC's
goals and the goals of the Rome Treaty. While it is the author's
belief that the CPC may well serve the twin goals of European
economic and politico-legal integration, it is quite evident that the
CPC perpetuates the territoriality of the national protection rights
and the continuing vitality of national standards in certain key
areas of Community patent law.' Thankfully, the residual defer-
ence of the CPC to territorial national protection rights is not as bad
as it could have been if the proposed "Protocol on the Deferred
Application of the Provisions on the Exhaustion of Rights Attached
to Community Patents" had been adopted as an integral part of the
7 [1976] 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771.
'Id.
' Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, preamble, para. 3.
10 Id. para. 4.
" [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9770-71.
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CPC. The fight over the Protocol on the Exhaustion of Rights, and
its concomitant negative effects on free trade in patented products
and equal conditions of competition, was a tug-of-war between the
applicability of national and Community law which was resolved in
favor of Community law through the efforts of the Commission of
the European Communities." The Plenipotentiaries at the Luxem-
bourg Conference did not incorporate the hotly disputed protocol as
part of the CPC. 13 It must be assumed that the Plenipotentiaries
acted out of their perception of the negative effect on the free move-
ment of goods which such a protocol would have. However, the
Commission's threat of legal action" under the Rome Treaty 5
should not be discounted.
Moreover, as alluded to above, certain provisions perpetuating
the territoriality of national protection rights did ultimately become
integral parts of the CPC.'8 Specifically, the CPC defers to national
jurisdiction in two areas of interest after the grant of a Community
patent; (1) the compulsory licensing of the Community patent; and
(2) actions for infringement of the Community patent." To be sure,
there are other aspects of the CPC which indicate deference to na-
tional protection rights such as the provisions for the protection of
prior national rights."
However, the treatment of prior national rights by the CPC is
fundamentally distinguishable from its treatment of compulsory li-
censing and actions for infringement. Whereas the former provisions
deal with problems which automatically resolve themselves into
nonproblems according to priorities in time pursuant to the terms
11 See Commission Opinion of April 4, 1974 concerning the Draft Convention for the Euro-
pean Patent for the Common Market and the Protocol annexed thereto, relating to the
deferred application of the provisions on the exhaustion of rights attached to Community
patents and national patents, 17 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 109) 34 (1974), reprinted in [1973-
1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9648, at 9442-45; Commission opinion of
September 26, 1975, on the Draft Convention for the European Patent for the Common
Market, 18 O.J. Eur. COMM. (No. L 261) 26 (1975), reprinted in [1973-1975 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9777, at 9723-27.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4.
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9777, at 9727: "Should the
proposals in regard to which the Commission has expressed an unfavorable view. . .be
adopted, the Commission reserves its right to institute proceedings under Article 169 for
failure to observe the obligations of the EEC Treaty." Id.
5 Rome Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169.
11 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, arts. 46, 47, 48, art. 69, para. 4, subpara.
(a), arts. 81, 82, 89.
' Id. art. 36, art. 69, paras. 1, 2, 3, arts. 79, 90.
" Id. art.37.
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of the convention, the latter provisions deal with problems which do
not automatically resolve themselves. Instead, the CPC provides a
juridical framework for a continuing application of national law to
the Community patent within the territories of the EEC Member
States regarding its compulsory licensing and infringement. Hence,
it is not unreasonable to suggest that the fabric of Community pat-
ent law may become a patchwork quilt in these key areas. The
pertinent question at this juncture is whether or not the CPC con-
tains adequate procedural mechanisms to ensure uniformity of
treatment of the Community patent by the national courts in these
areas. Are there sufficient safeguards in the CPC to prevent the
diversity of standards, or does the fundamental jurisdictional divi-
sion between the applicability of Community and national patent
laws to different aspects of the Community patent ensure a perpet-
ual duality, if not a diversity, of standards? As the title to this
article foreshadowed, the crucial issue is this: can the application
of national patent law to the Community patent be comple-
mentary?
The analytical framework for the examination of this issue is
tripartite. Section I presents background information for the subse-
quent discussion through a brief contextual history of the Com-
munity patent. In so doing, the relationship between the CPC and
the EPC will be elucidated and the "Community patent" and the
"European patent" will be distinguished. Furthermore, the place of
the CPC in the matrix of international patent legislation will be
detailed.
Section III consists of a comparative analysis of the national pat-
ent laws of the nine Member States of the EEC which will be deter-
minative of issues respecting the Community patent. Part A as-
sesses the diverse national approaches to compulsory licensing with
an eye to the possible effects of the continuing applicability of terri-
torial national protection rights to this aspect of Community patent
law. Part B consists of a comparative analysis of the various types
of national laws on actions for infringement as they affect the
Community patent. The jurisdictional bifurcation of the CPC on
the issues of patent validity and patent infringement will thus be
examined.
Section IV examines the quality of the substantive and proce-
dural regime established by the CPC, assessed in light of the funda-
mental issues outlined above. If the application of national law in
actions respecting compulsory licensing and infringement of the
[Vol. 7:95
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Community patent could have retrogressive effects upon both the
economic and the politico-legal integration of Europe, how can these
effects be minimized or avoided under the procedural regime estab-
lished by the CPC?
Finally, by way of conclusion, it is hoped that at least a tentative
answer to the fundamental question will have been reached: can the
application of national law to the Community patent be
complementary? If the answer is no or a qualified yes, we shall look
to the unfinished business ahead for the EEC.
II. A CONTEXTUAL HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY PATENT
The approximation of the various national patent laws of the
European States has been contemplated since World War Two."9
With the signing of the Rome Treaty and the creation of the EEC
in 1957, the approximation of national laws became an integral part
of the international mandate for economic integration. 0 The actual
creation of a unitary patent law for Europe was a long-term project
with a first draft convention being promulgated in 1962.21 The early
proposals of the 1960's envisaged the creation of two types of patents
for Europe which are related, yet analytically distinct. First, the
European patent, subsequently created by the EPC, would be avail-
able to all persons, natural and legal, of whatever nationality,2 and
would possess a unitary character in the countries designated by the
applicant in his application to the European Patent Office.2 A.
Campbell, in his treatise on Common Market Law illustrates the
essential flexibility of the European patent: "One company might
require patent protection only for the Community, Switzerland and
Austria, and another prefer to confine itself to the U.K. and Scandi-
navia. ' 24 Hence, the effect of the European patent only extends to
those countries specified as contracting states in the application. 5
1" Deringer, Toward European and EEC Patents, 16 ANTITRUST BuLL. 151 (1971); Nicolai,
The European Patent Convention: A Theoretical and Practical Look at International
Legislation, 5 INT'L LAW. 135, 136 (1971).
20 Rome Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 100-02.
11 European Patent Law, [1975] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 5501, at 4605.
2INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE FOR THE SETTING UP OF A EUROPEAN PATENTS SYSTEM,
GENERAL REPORT 3 (1971), reprinted in 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKr LAw § 4.10, at 240
(1973). This conference was held April 20 through April 28, 1971, in Luxembourg. European
Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 58.
European Patent Convention, supra note 6, arts. 3, 79; A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET
LAW § 4.10, at 305 (Supp. 1975).
1, 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 236 (1973).
European Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 79; European Patent Law, [1975] 2
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It is easy to see that, without more, the European patent could
contribute to the division of the EEC into diverse geographical mar-
kets, depending on the design of the applicant for the European
patent,2" and could produce concomitant distortions of competition.
Consequently, the early proposals of the 1960's envisaged a second
patefnt, the Community patent, brought to fruition by the CPC,
which would regulate the effects of a European patent in the Com-
mon Market.Y Briefly, if an applicant designates even one of the
Member States of the EEC on his application for a European pat-
ent, he is actually applying for a Community patent, 28 since under
the CPC, a designation of one Member State is deemed to be a
designation of the entire Community by operation of Community
law.2 1 Conversely, A. Campbell points to the essential inflexibility
of the Community patent: "As far as the Community is concerned
it would either be all or nothing. A European patent would be issued
only for all [the Community] countries together: no applicant
could request a European patent valid in, [for example], Germany
and the Benelux countries, but not in France and Italy. ' 30 The
complete patent scheme for the EEC, therefore, contemplates two
interrelated and interdependent conventions, the EPC and the
CPC. To provide for the smooth operation of the EEC patent re-
gime, it is contemplated that both conventions would enter into
force simultaneously. 31 In the absence of such a proviso, divisions of
the Common Market under the EPC could be possible. Indeed, it
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 5501.01, at 4605.
26 Final Drafting of a Community Patent Convention, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9568, at 9250:
To avoid dispersal of the effects of the European patent inside the Common Market
. . .and to prevent distortions of competition and the creation of barriers to the
free movement of goods owing to the territorial limits of national protection rights,
it was necessary to conclude a special convention establishing standardized rules
for validity and use of the European patent in the Member States of the Com-
munity.
Id.
'7 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 307 (Supp. 1975); [19751 2 COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 5501, at 4606.
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9568, at 9250. "An application
for a European patent [under the CPC] can only designate the Member States of the
Community. jointly; designation of one or more Member States is equivalent to designation
of all of them." Id.
" Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, arts. 2, 3; A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET
LAW § 4.10, at 305 (Supp. 1975).
10 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 236 (1973).
31 [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9568, at 9250.
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is expressly provided that the two conventions will enter into force
on the same date.32 The fruition of the early conceptions in the 1973
Munich Convention on the European Patent and the 1975 Luxem-
bourg Convention on the Community Patent represents a step, long
overdue, toward economic and politico-legal integration. The crises
of the Common Market during the 1960's over the entry of Britain,
a common agricultural policy, and the absence of the French repre-
sentative from the Council of the European Communities from July
of 1965 to February of 1966 sapped the dynamism of the EEC inte-
grative processes 3 and diverted attention from the establishment of
an EEC patent union during that decade.
Having sketched a contextual history of the Community patent
in light of the postwar movement toward European integration, and
having elucidated the relationship between the EPC and the CPC,
in relation to the European patent, it is appropriate at this juncture
to consider the place of the CPC in the matrix of international
patent legislation.
A. Campbell has noted that the accretion of international patent
legislation since the Paris Convention of 188311 has resulted in some
confusion.35 Consequently it is important to detail the place of the
CPC in the international framework in order that the roles of the
various international documents be kept analytically distinct. In a
nutshell, the CPC constitutes a special agreement within the mean-
ing of the 1973 EPC,36 a Regional Patent Treaty within the meaning
of the 1970 Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),37 and a special agree-
31 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4; [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9753.
31 H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1261-62 (2d ed. 1976).
1, International (Paris) Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20,
1883, [19701 2 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (revised Convention effective for United States
Sept. 5, 1970, except for arts. 1-12, effective May 19, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Paris Union].
The United States version, however, though readily accessible, does not incorporate certain
amendments to which the United States is not a party. The official English text of the Paris
Convention of March 20, 1883, as revised at Brussels on Dec. 14, 1900, at Washington on June
2, 1911, at The Hague on Nov. 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on Oct. 31, 1958,
and at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, may be found in 2A J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND
PRACTiCE app. 3, at 253 (1976). The text in BAXTER is reprinted from the text published by
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
31 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 237 (1973).
3, European Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 142. Article 142 provides in pertinent
part that "[a]ny group of Contracting States, which has provided by a special agreement
that a European patent granted for those States has a unitary character throughout their
territories, may provide that a European patent may only be granted jointly in respect of all
those States." Id.; Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, preamble, para. 7.
17 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 45, para. 1. The text reprinted from the
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ment within the meaning of the 1883 Paris Convention (Paris
Union) .38
The relationship between the EPC and the CPC having been
discussed above, it is important to turn to the relationship of the
CPC to the other conventions. First, the PCT, signed in Washington
by 35 nations in June of 1970, is not primarily concerned with the
establishment of an international patent, but with establishing pro-
cedures for sharing the work on the international processing of pat-
ents. " The PCT effects the goal of international processing through
its provisions for a common International Application, 0 an Interna-
tional Searching Authority,4' and an International Preliminary Ex-
amining Authority.42 The 35 Signatories of the PCT, including the
United States, not only can have direct access to the European and
Community patents under the EPC,4 3 but also can have direct ac-
cess through the PCT." Access to the EPC and CPC through the
PCT mechanism will be of especial benefit to United States indus-
try. United States businessmen need only make a single filing under
the PCT in the English language, designating one or more of the
contracting states to the EPC, to have easy access to the European
Patent.4 Where an EEC Member State is designated, access is
given to the Community Patent. The benefits which accrue to
United States business interests through the application of the PCT
to the EPC and CPC should be manifold." To avoid any confusion
text published by WIPO may be found in 2A J. BAXTEa, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE
app. 3, at 342.16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Patent Cooperation Treaty].
Paris Union, supra note 34, art. 19.
3' 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 239 (1973).
41 See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 37, art. 3. This article and other articles
which are applicable to the International Application is applicable to the European patent
and the Community patent through the EPC. See European Patent Convention, supra note
6, art. 150.
" See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 37, arts. 15-18. These articles and others
applicable to the International Search and the International Searching Authority are applic-
able to the European patent and the Community patent through the EPC. See European
Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 154.
,1 See, e.g., Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 37, arts. 31-42. The pertinent provisions
of these articles are applicable to the European patent and the Community patent through
the EPC. See European Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 155.
European Patent Convention, supra note 6, art. 58; U.S. Firms to Benefit from European
Patent Convention, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9618, at 9379.
" Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 37, art. 45, para. 1; [1973-1975 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9618, at 9379.
, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9618, at 9380.
4 Id. CCH cites primarily the cost savings and linguistic ease of one central filing in
English under the PCT-EPC-CPC regime. Id. at 9380-81.
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and to provide for the smooth initial operation of this tripartite
international patent regime, a declaration annexed to the CPC pro-
vides that the PCT will come into effect for the nine Member States
of the EEC on the same day as the EPC and the CPC."
Second, the relationship of the CPC to the Paris Union should be
indicated. The Paris Union" lays down certain basic principles in-
cluding that of equal, reciprocal treatment49 in patent matters for
nationals of the Member Countries. ° The CPC, as a special agree-
ment within the meaning of the Paris Union,5' is consistent with
the principle of equal, reciprocal treatment; however, reciprocity for
one EEC Member State under the Paris Union will now be reciproc-
ity for all EEC Member States under the CPC as far as the Com-
munity patent is concerned. The Paris Union is also important in
relation to the focal point of this inquiry. Granted that the CPC
provides a juridical basis for the application of national law in com-
pulsory licensing of the Community patent, the Paris Union pro-
vides for the substantive unification of certain aspects of the law of
compulsory licensing.52 Furthermore, all Member States of the EEC
are Signatories thereto. 3 Hence, in the area of compulsory licensing,
the complementary application of national law to the Community
patent under the CPC will be facilitated by the unification effected
by the Paris Union.
. Third, and also germane to the analytical focus of this inquiry, is
the relationship of the CPC to the Strasbourg Convention. 4 While
it is true that the CPC creates one body of substantive Community
law to govern most of the effects of the Community patent, obviat-
ing the need to look to a multiplicity of national laws, 55 we have
11 See Declaration on the Ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, in Final Act of
the Plenipotentiaries of the Member States of the EEC on the Occasion of the Luxembourg
Conference on the Community Patent, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 17) 36, 41 (1976).
' Paris Union, supra note 34.
, Id. art. 2.
3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW § 4.10, at 237 (1973).
, Paris Union, supra note 34, art. 19.
12 Id. art. 5, para. A, subparas. (2), (3), (4).
" Of the nine Member States of the EEC, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal
Republic), Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are parties to
the latest revision of Union, the Stockholm Text of 1967. Italy, however, is a Signatory of the
1958 Lisbon text.
1, Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for
Invention, Nov. 27, 1963, reprinted in 2A J. BAxTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTCE, app.
3, at 300 (1976). This convention should not be confused with the 1971 Strasbourg Agreement
Concerning the International Patent Classification.
" [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9618, at 9380-81.
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seen that this is not the case in all areas. The Strasbourg Conven-
tion is of signal importance since it provides uniform guidelines for
certain aspects of national patent legislation.56 Indeed, if the appli-
cation of national patent laws under the CPC to compulsory
licensing and actions for infringement is to be complementary, the
Strasbourg Convention is a model of the way to reconcile diverse
national laws and divergent standards. In 1973 the Strasbourg Con-
vention had already been followed in the drafts of the new Irish,
Scandinavian and French patent laws.57 As A. Campbell then noted,
"[iut will undoubtedly govern the basis of any new U.K. legislation
.... ,5. The Plenipotentiaries of the EEC Member States, at the
Luxembourg Conference on the Community Patent, acknowl-
edged the importance of the Strasbourg Convention by resolving to
commence work, as soon as the CPC is signed, "to adjust their laws
relating to national patents as soon as possible so as to permit ratifi-
cation of the Strasbourg Convention" 9 in order to prevent a
"duality of standards in patent law in those States," 0 the patent
laws of which embody standards and provisions which differ from
the CPC.'
Such is the relationship of the CPC to the major related conven-
tions in the matrix of international patent legislation. In digesting
these materials it is important to note that the issues of the unifica-
tion of standards respecting compulsory licensing and infringement
actions are not solved, or even often addressed, by the international
legislators. Such questions remain the preserve of the national
courts, as evidenced by the CPC. At this juncture in the analytical
trek, we must remain dissatisfied. Will the application of national
law to the compulsory licensing and infringement of the Community
patent under the CPC be complementary? A contextual history and
an examination of the relationship of the CPC to the other major
conventions is not very enlightening. Having approached the ques-
tion from the standpoint of the related international legislation and
51 3 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAw § 4.10, at 238 (1973). The Strasbourg Convention
does not address itself to the problems of unification of national laws respecting compulsory
licensing and infringement, however.
57 Id.
Id.
" See Resolution on the Adjustment of National Patent Law, in Final Act of the Plenipo-
tentiaries of the Member States of the EEC on the Occasion of the Luxembourg Conference
on the Community Patent, 19 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 17) 36, 41 (1976).
aId.
61 Id.
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having found few answers, the question should now be approached
from the standpoint of the applicable national legislation. Accord-
ingly, a comparative analysis of the "complementary" national laws
on compulsory licensing and patent infringement under the CPC
follows.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABLE
"COMPLEMENTARY" NATIONAL LAWS
It is self evident that the creation of a unitary patent system for
the nine Member States of the EEC, prior to their politico-legal
integration, was no easy task. The fact that the Plenipotentiaries
agreed to establish one system of law to govern the Community
patent, 2 and provided that the effects of the Community patent
shall be evaluated pursuant to Community law alone, 3 is remarka-
ble. These two salient features, when coupled with the provisions
concerning the exhaustion of national rights with regard to both the
Community and national patents, 4 constitute evidence of a resolute
commitment to the economic and politico-legal integration of Eu-
rope. The achievement of a unitary patent law for the Community
at this time is all the more remarkable in light of a respectable body
of opinion which postulated the politico-legal integration of Europe
as a precondition to the unification of the various substantive na-
tional patent laws. L. Robbins, writing in 1960 at the time of the
early suggestions for a European patent for the EEC, reported the
clear majority opinion of national patent authorities, "that due to
complexities and differences in the various patent systems, any
question of integration of patent laws must follow and not precede
general political and legal integration." 5 Notwithstanding the pres-
ent state of affairs, namely, the continuing politico-legal diversity
of Europe, a Community patent union was achieved. Due to the
62 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, paras. 1, 2.
'3 Id. art. 2, paras, 2, 3. These provisions provide that Community patents shall have a
unitary and autonomous character with equal effect throughout the Common Market. "They
shall be subject only to the provisions of this Convention and those provisions of the European
Patent Convention which are binding upon every European patent and which shall conse-
quently be deemed to be provisions of this Convention." Id. art. 2, para. 2.
1, Id. arts. 32, 81. However, with regard to compulsory licensing, see art. 81, para. 3.
Robbins, Patents in the European Community, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 INSTITUTE ON
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 165 (1960) [hereinafter cited as ROBBINS]. For
a different interpretation of Robbins' findings in light of the events since he wrote, see
Comment, The EEC Patent Union and Political Integration, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
342, 348 (1973).
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balance of fervor between national patent interests and Community
integrative interests, represented primarily by the Commission of
the EEC, the union achieved by the CPC was inescapably incom-
plete. Furthermore, the reconciliation of legislative diversity by the
CPC was complicated by the fact that, at present, there are two
quite different patent systems in operation throughout the EEC,"6
the "registration, non-examination" 7 system and the "novelty and
subject matter examination system." 8 The Plenipotentiaries, in
drafting the CPC, felt the pressures of national diversity but, rather
than treating the various national differences as insoluble and
thereby sacrificing the larger goals of economic and politico-legal
integration, they effected a compromise solution: the complemen-
tary application of national patent laws to certain aspects of the
Community patent, namely, its compulsory licensing and infringe-
ment. More importantly, the integrative forces, predominantly the
Commission of the EEC, won the crucial battle in defeating the
proposed Protocol on the deferred application of the provisions on
exhaustion of rights. 9
The Plenipotentiaries were not unaware of the potentially preca-
rious compromise which they effected. They realized that the
"unitary" patent regime for Europe, enunciated by the CPC, was
incomplete. Further, realizing that the application of national pat-
ent laws to the compulsory licensing and infringement of the Com-
munity patent might not be complementary, the Plenipotentiaries
resolved to form a more perfect union later. Their goal was twofold:
(1) to solidify the present gains in the process of integration by
signing the CPC now; and (2) to work out remaining differences and
supplement the CPC later.
First, with regard to the applicability of national law to the com-
pulsory licensing of the Community patent, the EEC Member
States, while recognizing the necessity for individual nations to be
able to grant compulsory licenses with respect to Community pat-
ents in certain circumstances, 0 resolved "to commence the work, as
" Comment, The EEC Patent Union and Political Integration, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 342, 347 (1973).
7 ROBBINS, supra note 65, at 164.
SId.
See notes 12, 13, 14 supra.
10 See Resolution on Common Rules on the Granting of Compulsory Licenses in Respect
of Community Patents, in Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries of the Member States of the EEC
on the Occasion of the Luxembourg Conference on the Community Patent, 19 O.J. EUR.
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soon as the Convention enters into force, to enable the Convention
to be supplemented by common rules on the granting of compulsory
licenses." 7' Such rules would enforce the unitary character of Com-
munity patents and thereby serve the integrative goals of both the
CPC72 and the principles of the Rome Treaty.73 The Plenipoten-
tiaries saw the speedy promulgation of these supplemental regula-
tions as imperative, since "the retention of powers of the national
authorities to grant compulsory licenses in respect of Community
patents can only be envisaged for a short transitional period because
of fundamental legislative differences affecting the free movement
of goods protected by patents and the elimination of the distortion
of competition."7
Second, respecting the application of national law in actions for
infringement of the Community patent, the EEC Signatories also
perceived that the complementary application of national law could
be retrogressive to the integrative goals of the CPC and the Rome
Treaty and acted on their perception by promulgating two distinct
calls for supplemental action; once again, such action is to be taken
after solidifying present integrative gains through signing the CPC.
(1) In one resolution respecting infringement actions,75 each Mem-
ber State of the EEC declared its intention "to promote, as far as
possible, uniformity of judicial practice. . .in respect of actions for
infringement of Community patents"" by providing for experienced
judges to hear such actions through "the centralization in their
respective territories of first instance jurisdiction in respect of the
infringement of Community patents."" (2) In another resolution,7"
COMM. (No. L 17) 36, 39-40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Resolution on Common Rules for
Compulsory Licensing].
Id. at 40.
" Id. at 39; Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, preamble, paras. 3, 4.
73 Rome Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 2, 3.
", Resolution on Common Rules for Compulsory Licensing, supra note 70, at 40 (emphasis
added).
71 See Resolution on the Centralization in Each Contracting State of Jurisdiction in Actions
for Infringement of Community Patents, in Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries of the Member
States of the EEC on the Occasion of the Luxembourg Conference on the Community Patent,
19 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 17) 36, 40 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Resolution on Centraliza-
tion].
76 Id.
77 Id.
"' See Resolution on Litigation of Community Patents, in Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries
of the Member States of the EEC on the Occasion of the Luxembourg Conference on the
Community Patent, 19 O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 17) 36, 40-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Resolution on Litigation].
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the CPC Signatories addressed a cardinal difficulty which flows
from the complementary application of national law in actions for
infringement of the Community patent, namely, the bifurcation of
jurisdiction respecting patent validity and patent infringement.7 9
Therefore, the EEC Member States covenanted, once again, after
signature of the CPC, "to commence. . .the necessary work to pro-
vide a solution. . .[S]uch a solution [would]. . .be embodied if
possible in a Protocol which should be concluded before any litiga-
tion on Community patents takes place and at the latest within 10
years from the date of signing of [this] Convention."8 Accordingly,
a Working Party was to be established to work on this knotty prob-
lem "without delay after signature of this Convention."'"
The accurate perceptions of the Plenipotentiaries of the present
problems with the CPC and their resolute calls for future supple-
mental action to the contrary notwithstanding, the CPC must be
objectively appraised for what it is: a compromise document calling
for the complementary application of national law. Hence, we can-
not assume that practice under the CPC will be idyllic and that the
EEC signatories can solve the difficulties engendered by these juris-
dictional bifurcations between national and Community law "be-
fore any litigation on Community patents takes place." '82 Since na-
tional law will expressly apply to the compulsory licensing and in-
fringement of the Community patent, it is appropriate at this point
in the inquiry (1) to examine the diverse laws of the nine EEC
Member States respecting compulsory licensing of patents and ac-
tions for patent infringement and (2) to subject these national laws
to comparative analysis with an eye to those "fundamental legisla-
tive differences '8 3 which may adversely affect the administration of
the Community patent regime by Community institutions, and
which therefore may be in contraposition to the achievement of the
goals of the CPC and the principles of the Treaty of Rome. Part A
immediately follows with a comparison of applicable compulsory
licensing law. Part B examines the applicable law of patent infringe-
ment.
Id.
Id. at 40-41 (emphasis added).
Id. at 41.
92 Id.
11 Resolution on Common Rules for Compulsory Licensing, supra note 70, at 40.
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A. National Compulsory Licensing Laws in the EEC
A comparative study of compulsory licensing law indicates that
the rationale for such laws is mercantilistic; such laws are on the
books to force domestic manufacture rather than to encourage trade
among nations. 4 The general idea is to encourage the working of
new inventions on a commercial scale within the particular nation
state.8 5 This rationale is illuminating as to the reasons why the EEC
Member States did not effect a complete unification of their com-
pulsory licensing laws in the CPC, but instead opted for the comple-
mentary application of national law. The realization of the reasons
for the reluctance of the EEC Member States to relinquish control
over compulsory licensing to Community institutions is a sobering
one if we 'are concerned with the actualization of the goals of the
CPC and the principles of the Rome Treaty. "Since the conditions
for the grant of compulsory licenses vary from one Member State
to another, the reference to national law would lead to varying
degrees of restriction of the right conferred by the Community pat-
ent and thus to unequal conditions of competition for industry."8'
Obviously the resolution to supplement the CPC with common rules
on compulsory licensing is of great import.
The CPC makes any provision in the national laws of the EEC
Member States for the grant of compulsory licenses for national
patents applicable to the Community patent, 8 with the provisos
that national applicability shall be limited by the principle of terri-
toriality9 and that the provision on the exhaustion of rights shall not
apply. 0 Hence, the juridical basis exists for a patchwork of licensing
requirements among the nine Member States with concomitant an-
ticompetitive effect and adverse effects on the intra-community free
movement of patented products, since the laws of each EEC State
contain provisions variously restricting the right of exclusivity con-
ferred by the grant of a patent, if the manner of exploitation or non-
exploitation of the patent monopoly is deemed prejudicial to the
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 441 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA].
" W. LANG, FOREIGN PATENT LAws WITH COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 703 (W. Wade ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS].
" Community Patent Conference Under Way, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9753.
97 Id.; Resolution on Common Rules for Compulsory Licensing, supra note 70.
" Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 46, para. 1.
0 Id.; [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9753.
" Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, arts. 32, 46, para. 1.
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public.9' The complementary application of national law could gen-
erate territorial diversity of standards for the Community patent in
the three major compulsory licensing contexts: compulsory licenses
on grounds of public health, security, national defense;9" compulsory
licenses on the grounds of non-exploitation, where "the product
protected by a patent is not manufactured or not manufactured in
sufficient quantities on national territory;" 3 and compulsory licen-
ses where there are interdependent patents, the "grant-back" situa-
tion94 where "the invention which is the subject of a recent patent
is based on an invention protected by a previous patent and can
therefore not be developed without the consent of the proprietor of
the earlier patent."9 Each of these three contexts will be examined
in light of the CPC treatment thereof and the applicable comple-
mentary national law.
1. Compulsory Licenses in the Public Interest
First, with regard to compulsory licenses granted in the public
interest, the CPC establishes no specific guidelines;" hence, the
general provisions apply in that national laws shall be applicable 7
with the national courts having exclusive jurisdiction,98 the holding
of the national court on compulsory licensing of the Community
patent being limited to the national territory.99 With regard to the
applicable complementary national laws, treatment of compulsory
licensing in the public interest varies; the laws of some states ad-
dress the problem while the laws of others are mute.
a. Belgium. The law of Belgium on compulsory licensing is
sparse. The Belgian Patent Act does not specifically refer to the
subject;10 hence, the Belgian law on compulsory licensing consists
only of the applicable provisions of the Paris Union,'0' of which
" [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9752.
2 Id.
11 Id. at 9752-53.
,4 LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 701.
1 [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9753.
94 This is the case due to the opinion, commonly held by the Governments of the EEC
Member States, that the nation state should have the power to delimit the private property
rights of the patentee for the public good. See Resolution on Common Rules for Compulsory
Licensing, supra note 70.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 46, para. 1.
Id. art. 69, para. 4, subpara. (a).
Id. art. 46, para. 1.
' LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 703.
'o' Paris Union, supra note 34, art. 5, para. a, subparas. 2, 3, 4, 5.
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Belgium is an adherent to the latest 1967 Stockholm revision.' 2
"Belgian law does not provide for compulsory licenses.for reasons of
public interest.' '0 3
b. Denmark. In contradistinction to the law of Belgium, how-
ever, is the Danish patent law which provides for certain granting
of compulsory licenses in the public interest. As P. Garde, Secretary
of the Danish Ministry of Justice in Copenhagen observes, "[iln
exceptional circumstances a compulsory license may be granted if
the public will so demands."'0 4 There is some basis for the uniform-
ity of certain aspects of compulsory licensing law. With eight other
EEC States, Denmark is a Signatory of the 1967 Stockholm revision
of the Paris Union.'0 5 Furthermore, the law of compulsory licensing
within Denmark is likely to be uniform since jurisdiction for all such
cases is centralized in the maritime and commercial court in Copen-
hagen.'06
c. France. The French patent provisions establish a system of
"licenses of right" granted in the interest of public health where the
Minister of Public Health orders it.107 Such licenses of right are
applicable to patents granted for a medicine or processes to produce
a medicine, whenever the medicine (1) is made available to the
public in insufficient quantities, or (2) is deficient in quality, or (3)
is sold at exorbitant prices.'08 Upon publication of such an order by
the Minister of Health, any qualified person may apply to the Min-
ister of Industrial Property for a license of right to exploit the pat-
ent.' 0 France is also a signatory to the 1967 Stockholm revision of
the Paris Union."10
d. Federal Republic of Germany. According to the provisions of
the German patent law, only the public interest will justify the
restriction of the patent owner's rights."' "Depending upon the de-
1O 2 J. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 129 (1976).
103 Chome & Haulot, Belgium: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 4 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Chome
& Haulot, Belgium: Patent Law].
10, Garde, Denmark: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TADEMARKS 2 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Garde,
Denmark: Patent Law].
105 Note 102 supra.
,0, Garde, Denmark: Patent Law, supra note 104.
107 French Patent Law § 37, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 709B.
1 Id.
I0 d. § 38.
,,0 Note 102 supra.
German Patent Law, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 711.
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gree of such interest, gradations in the restrictions range from a
reduction of the effective rights of a patent, through the granting of
compulsory licenses, to the classification of the invention as se-
cret.""' Virtually no compulsory license has been granted in Ger-
many."3 Germany also is party to the Paris Union as revised in
Stockholm."
e. Ireland. Ireland, also a Signatory to the 1967 Stockholm revi-
sion of the Paris Union, 115 only provides for the compulsory licensing
of patents where there has been an abuse of the patent monopoly
rights. No provision speaks specifically to the granting of patents in
the public interest for reasons of health, security or defense.16
f. Italy. The Italian statute, containing no public interest com-
pulsory licensing provisions per se, 117 does provide for the expropria-
tion of the patentee's rights "in the interest of defense or public
utility."'" 8 Italy is a signatory to the 1958 Lisbon version of the Paris
Union." 9 Differences between the provisions of the Lisbon and
Stockholm versions on compulsory licensing, however, are de min-
imis. 120
g. Luxembourg. The Luxembourg law provides that after three
years, a compulsory license may be granted to other exploiters who
applied for it, where the public interest so demands. 2' Luxembourg
is party to the Paris Union, Stockholm revision. 2
h. Netherlands. Under the Netherlands statute, the patentee is
bound to grant a license for reasons of public interest. 2 3 Further, the
112 Id.
v on Uexkull, Federal Republic of Germany: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 4 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as von Uexkull, West Germany: Patent Law].
"' Note 102 supra.
"1 Id.
Williams, The Republic of Ireland: Patent Law and Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COM-
MERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 7, 9 [hereinafter cited as Williams,
Ireland: Patent Law].
"T Italian Patent Law, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 712.
Id. at 713.
"' Note 102 supra.
" See the Lisbon and Stockholm compulsory licensing language in 2A J. BAXTER, WORLD
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE at 239, 253.5, 253.6.
I Gredt, Luxembourg: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF
THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 2 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Gredt,
Luxembourg: Patent Law].
122 Note 102 supra.
"2 The Netherlands Patent Law, § 34(1), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note
85, at 717.
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State, where it deems it "necessary to the defense of the Realm,' ' 24
can be given the authority to use the patent.'25 The Netherlands is
party to the Paris Union, Stockholm revision.
26
i. United Kingdom. The U.K., also party to the Stockholm re-
vision of the Paris Union,' 7 provides that where there is a patent for
"(a) a substance capable of being used as food or medicine or in the
production of food or medicine; or (b) process for producing such a
substance. . .or (c) any invention capable of being used as or as a
part of a surgical or curative device,"'2 8 there shall be compulsory
licensing without delay upon application 29 unless there are good
reasons for not doing so.130
2. Compulsory Licenses for Non-Exploitation of a Patent
As P. Areeda has observed, a significant way for the patentee to
exercise his patent is to suppress it by neither using nor licensing
it.' 3 Since a patent has value in the marketplace, the rational pa-
tentee will not license it if it creates unwanted and unprofitable
competition with himself. 3 Because such practices may be consid-
ered as abuses of the patent monopoly,' 33 nation states have pro-
vided for non-exploitation of a patent, "mainly because of the con-
cern over the fact that the foreign owners of such inventions could,
by refusing to exploit the patents, prevent the development of na-
tional industries which might give employment to nationals and
utilize available national resources.' '134 However, as observed ear-
lier, '3 the rationale of such provisions is mercantilistic and national-
istic. For the Member States of the EEC, a prolonged complemen-
tary application of national compulsory licensing provisions to the
Community patent will be detrimental to the free movement of
goods and will distort competition within the Common Market.
"I Id. § 34a(1).
'2 Warendof, The Netherlands: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 4 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Warendorf, The Netherlands: Patent Law].
Ia Note 102 supra.
127 Id.
' British Patent Law § 41(1), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 722.
Iz ld. at 701.
"3 Id. at 722.
3 ARA, supra note 84, at 438.
132 Id.
"1 LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 700.
134 Id.
"' See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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The drafters of the CPC resolved this dilemma by providing that
compulsory licenses for lack or insufficiency of exploitation of Com-
munity patents may not be granted by the national courts in apply-
ing their national provisions on compulsory licensing to the Com-
munity patent where (1) the product manufactured within the EEC,
(2) is put on the market in the territory of a State for which a
compulsory license for non-exploitation has been requested, (3) in
sufficient quantity to satisfy the needs within the territory of that
State. 36 These same provisions apply, mutatis mutandis, to com-
pulsory licenses granted for lack or insufficiency of exploitation of
national patents of the EEC Member States. 37
Given provisions in the CPC such as these, designed to promote
the free movement of goods protected by patents throughout the
Community and to transcend the territoriality and mercantilism of
national compulsory licensing, the question arises: why worry about
the complementary application of national law to the compulsory
licensing of the Community patent for non-exploitation? The an-
swer to the question inheres in another provision of the CPC, the
"Reservation in respect of compulsoiy licenses,' ' 3 which provides
that the provisions of the CPC concerning compulsory licenses for
lack or insufficiency of exploitation of Community patents or na-
tional patents 139 would not apply in the territory of the States which
exercise the reservations during a transitional period of not more
than fifteen years.4 0 This reservation was included in the CPC
"[in response to the requirements of the domestic industrial pol-
icy of certain Member States."'4 While it is true that the Plenipo-
tentiaries resolved to immediately draw. up" common rules on com-
pulsory licensing to supplement the CPC,"2 thereby automatically
bringing the "Reservation in respect of compulsory licensing" to an
end by operation of law,4 3 it is still probably wise to look to the
diverse national laws of the nine EEC states on the assumptions
"I Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 47; Community Patent Convention
Signed, [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9770-71.
' Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 82; [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9797, at 9771.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 89.
"' Id. arts. 47, 82; 119761 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771.
"' (1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771; Community Patent Convention,
supra note 4, art. 89, para. 2.
'[1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771.
', Resolution on Common Rules for Compulsory Licensing, supra note 70.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 89, para. 3.
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that (1) some Member States might enter into the Reservation in
response to their domestic industrial constituencies, and (2) that
the preparation of "common rules" will not take place overnight.
Objectively viewed, it is plain that, where States make the Reserva-
tion, the CPC may call for the complementary application of na-
tional laws for a period of up to 15 years.'
a. Belgium. Under the Paris Union, compulsory licenses may be
granted for non-exploitation after a certain time period.'45 However,
the grant of authority "consists of a special administrative proce-
dure which has not yet been put into effect under Belgian law.' 46
While Belgium has not passed compulsory licensing legislation, a
patent may be revoked for non-working.'47 Whether the complemen-
tary application of that provision would allow for the territorial
partial revocation of the Community patent in Belgium under the
CPC'45 is open to question.
b. Denmark. Danish law provides for compulsory licensing for
non-exploitation of a patent "unless good reason causes the non-
working.""'4 Hence, there is also a juridical basis in Danish law for
the creation of obstacles to the free movement of patented products
throughout the Community and continuing potential deference to
national mercantile interests.
c. France. After an amicable request by a third party for a li-
cense has been refused by the patentee5 ° and, upon a showing by
the third party of ability to exploit the patent so as to satisfy the
requirements of the national market, a third party may obtain a
compulsory license from the tribunal de grande instance. '5' The tri-
bunal shall set (1) the duration of the compulsory license, (2) its
field of application, and (3) the amount of royalties to be paid to
the patentee.' 52 Furthermore, patentees' 53 "may be given formal no-
tice by the Minister. . .for Industrial Property to undertake the
IA Id. art. 89, para. 2.
" Paris Union, supra note 34, art. 5. The time periods are uniform for all EEC states since
all are Signatories to the Union. Id. art. 5, para. a, subpara. (4).
a Chome & Haulot, Belgium: Patent Law, supra note 103, at 4.
SLANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 703.
Al Community Patent Convention; supra note 4, art. 46, para. 1.
"' Garde, Denmark: Patent Law, supra note 104, at 2, 3.
Weinstein, France: Patent Law & Practice, in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 5 (G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein,
France: Patent Law].
"' French Patent Law § 33, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 709a.
1 O2 Id.
''Owners of patents on medicines are not included.
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exploitation of. . .patents so as to satisfy the requirements of the
national economy.' 54 If no action is taken within a year and the
non-exploitation is highly prejudicial to economic development and
public interest, the patent becomes subject to compulsory licens-
ing. 5 5 As is evident, these provisions not only introduce the discre-
tion of the domestic tribunal into the terms of the compulsory li-
censing of the Community patent, but also introduce considerations
of French economic development and public policy.
d. Federal Republic of Germany. German law does not recognize
any compulsory licenses for failure to work or insufficient working
of a patent,'56 but only grants compulsory licenses using a broad
"public interest" criterion.'57 Hence, the provisions of the Paris
Union 5 " do not appear to apply,'59 although there is confusion as to
the Union's applicability where an application of a third party to
the Patent Tribunal is based upon both non-exploitation and
"public interest."'' 0 Further, if the public interest cannot be satis-
fied by granting compulsory licenses, a patent may be withdrawn if
the invention is exclusively or mainly exported outside Germany,'"'
except where conventions between States apply.'62
e. Republic of Ireland. Irish law embodies classic mercantile
justifications for the granting of compulsory licenses which, when
applied to the Community patent, could produce yet another na-
tional territorial result. The rationale of such provisions is not only
to encourage invention but also to provide for commercial working
within Ireland.' Such licenses for non-exploitation within Ireland
will be granted where the Controller finds an "abuse of monopoly
rights under the Patent."'' 4 Particular grounds for abuse of monop-
oly rights which could affect the Community patent in Ireland are:
"I French Patent Law § 39, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 709b.
155 Id.
"' Id. at 711; von Uexkull, West Germany: Patent Law, supra note 113, at 4.
,' German Patent Law § 15(1), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 710;
see note 156 supra.
' Paris Union, supra note 34, art. 5, para. a, subpara. (4).
"' LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 711.
io Id.
,' German Patent Law § 15(2), cited in id. at 710.
162 LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 711. For example, "[working of Ger-
man patents owned by nationals of the United States is not required, according to the United
States-German Treaty of February 23, 1909." Id.
,,3 Irish Patent Law § 39(2)(6), cited in Williams, Ireland: Patent Law, supra note 116, at
7, 8.
"I Williams, Ireland: Patent Law, supra note 116, at 7.
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(1) where an invention which is capable of being commercially
worked in Ireland is either not being worked at all or not being
worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable within the
country;"' (2) where the demand for the patented product is being
met to a substantial extent by importation rather than by domestic
production;' .;(3) where the commercial working within Ireland is
prevented or hindered by importation of the patented product;""
and (4) where the establishment or development of domestic indus-
try or commerce is being unfairly prejudiced through refusal of the
patentee to grant a license."" It goes without saying that such provi-
sions could have negative effects upon the free movement of pat-
ented goods, and could distort competition within the EEC when
applied in a complementary manner to the Community patent on
the basis of territoriality.
f. Italy. Italian law provides for the lapse of a patent which is
not worked, 9 where valid working is defined as manufactured in
Italy on a scale commensurate with domestic needs, with importa-
tion not deemed to be valid working. 70 The non-working or insuffi-
cient working does not cause a lapse by operation of law; instead,
the patent must be declared revoked by a court. 7 '
g. Luxembourg. If the patentee fails to exploit his invention in
the Grand Duchy within a reasonable time, using his best efforts,
the patent may be withdrawn by Grand Ducal Ordinance. 7 2 In pro-
viding for compulsory licensing, Luxembourg employs a "public
interest" criterion 7 ' similar to that of West Germany. In Luxem-
bourg the finding of public interest is declared by Grand Ducal
Ordinance upon advice of the Council of State.'
h. The Netherlands. The criterion embodied in these statutes
also serves national mercantile interests. If the patentee fails to
make use of his patent after a certain time, he must license it if
"5 Irish Patent Law § 39(2)(1), cited in id.
'" Id. § 39(2)(2).
", Id. § 39(2)(3).
Id. § 39(2)(4)(iii).
' LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 712; Bentivoglio, Italy: Patent Law and
Practice in 1 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 6 (G.
Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Bentivoglio, Italy: Patent Law].
170 LAG, COMPARATIVE ANAYSIS supra note 85, at 712.
'7' Id. at 713.
", Gredt, LUXEMBOURG: PATENT LAW, supra note 121, at 2.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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"desirable in the interest of industry in the Realm or in the colonies
or possessions."'7 ' The patentee, after three years from the date of
the patent, must grant a license if an industry has not been estab-
lished in the Kingdom which sufficiently makes use of the patent
through manufacture of the product on an adequate scale or through
sufficient use of the process or improvement.' If the patentee fails
to do so, the Patent Office itself may issue such licenses and deter-
mine the royalties due the patentee.'77
i. United Kingdom. The British law also provides for compul-
sory licensing where "there is inadequate working or oppressive con-
duct by the patentee."' 78 The provisions of the British statute are
so similar to those of the Irish law discussed above as to justify the
inference of a common source.'79 However, when applied by the
different judicial systems of the two sovereign States, the similarity
may vanish. Further, the statutes each embody highly protective
provisions for British and Irish industrial interests, respectively.
3. Compulsory Licensing of Interdependent Patents
In order to eliminate wasteful, duplicative research by competi-
tors seeking access to existing but patented technology,"' to encour-
age research and invention by new entries where the use of any
discovered improvement may be blocked by earlier interdependent
patents held by industrial patentees of strong market position, 8'
and to ease the spread of technology in society, 8 ' compulsory licens-
ing of interdependent patents has been seen as advantageous.
Briefly, if a license under an earlier patent is necessary to be able
to work a later patent which represents an improvement in the state
of the existing art, many States have compelled the earlier patentee
to license the later one (a "grant back"). The drafters of the CPC
recognized the social utility of such licensing and expressly provided
that any provisions in the laws of the EEC Member States for the
"I The Netherlands Patent Statute § 34(1), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra
note 85, at 717. The possessions and colonies are Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.
'7' Id. § 34(2).
SWarendorf, THE NETHERLANDS: PATENT LAW, supra note 125, at 4.
,7 Pickering, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Patent Law and
Practice, in 2 DIGEST OF THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD: PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 5
(G. Kohlik ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Pickering, United Kingdom: Patent Law].
"T' See notes 163-68 supra and accompanying text.
I'D AREEDA, supra note 84, at 441.
11 Id.
192 Id.
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grant of compulsory licenses on earlier patents in favor of later
dependent patents "shall be applicable to the relationship between
Community patents and national patents and to the relationship
between Community patents themselves."' 83 This provision is not
subject to the "Reservation in respect of compulsory licenses" dis-
cussed earlier."4 Further, the applicable national laws here are not
merely complementary; instead, they constitute the entire body of
law applicable to this aspect of the compulsory licensing of the
Community patent, since the CPC does not establish compulsory
licensing for interdependent patents as a matter of substantive
Community law. Rather, national provisions are incorporated by
reference."' Hence, a comparative exposition of these provisions is
appropriate.
a. Belgium. Belgian law does not provide for compulsory licens-
ing for interdependent patents." The applicable provision of the
CPC incorporating national law therefore has no meaning. The lack
of such a provision where other States may have one is, however, a
basis for unequal treatment of patented goods within the EEC.
b. Denmark. Denmark, however, permits the owner of a subse-
quent patent, the working of which depends on another earlier pat-
ent, to get a compulsory license "if special reasons advocate it."', 7
Such law will be applicable to the Community patent within Den-
mark.
c. France. The French law also contains provisions which will be
applicable to this aspect of the Community patent. Generally, the
owner of the later improvement patent shall not work his invention
unless he gets the consent of the earlier patentee. Conversely, the
earlier patentee may not use the improvement technology without
the consent of the subsequent patentee. 8 8 The tribunal de grande
instance, after hearing the State Attorney, may grant to the owner
of the improvement patent a nonexclusive license on the earlier
patent which is the subject of the improvement. 9 Such license must
be necessary to work the new patent, and the improvement must
represent a "substantial technical advance" over the earlier pat-
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 48.
"' See notes 138-40 supra and accompanying text.
' Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 48.
lW Chome & Haulot, Belgium: Patent Law, supra note 103, at 4.
IN Garde, Denmark: Patent Law, supra note 104, at 3.
" French Patent Law § 36, cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 709A.
' Id. at 709A, 709B.
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ented article.9 0 Furthermore, under French law the owner of the
earlier patent can request the court to grant him a license under the
improvement patent,' "by way of compensation""'9 for his grant to
the improvement patentee.
d. Federal Republic of Germany. The law of West Germany does
not make provision for compulsory licensing for dependent patents.
The patentee's rights under his patent may only be restricted when
it is in the public interest to do so.' 9 Conceivably the grant of a
license on an earlier patent necessary to exploit a later significant
improvement in technology could be deemed within the public in-
terest.
e. Republic of Ireland. Under the Irish law there is a provision
which will be applicable to this aspect of the Community patent.
One ground which constitutes an "abuse of monopoly rights under
a patent,"'94 and which therefore will justify compulsory licensing,
exists where the refusal of the earlier patentee to grant a license or
to grant a license on reasonable terms prevents or hinders "[tihe
working or efficient working in the State of any other patented
invention which makes a substantial contribution to the art."'95
f. Italy. Italian law has some provisions which will be applicable
to this aspect of compulsory licensing of the Community patent. A
compulsory license may be granted where a later patent cannot be
worked without disturbing the rights of a prior patentee. 9 ' The im-
provement patentee's invention must constitute, however, "a re-
markable improvement of the art,"'97 a requirement similar to that
of the French provisions.' 8 Further, if both inventions have the
same industrial purpose, the prior patentee may request that he be
granted a compulsory license on the improvement, 99 a provision also
similar to the French solution. 00
g. Luxembourg. The law of the Grand Duchy does not contain
1i0 Id.
191 Id.
"I Weinstein, France: Patent Law, supra note 150, at 5.
,13 LANG, COMPARATIVE ANLysIs, supra note 85, at 711; von Uexkull, West Germany: Patent
Law, supra note 113, at 4.
" Williams, Ireland: Patent Law, supra note 116, at 7.
", Irish Patent Statute § 39(2)(4)(ii), cited in id. at 7.
P, Bentivoglio, Italy: Patent Law, supra note 169, at 6.
197 Id.
"' See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
"' Bentivoglio, Italy: Patent Law, supra note 169, at 6.
See notes 191, 192 supra and accompanying text.
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provisions on interdependent patents. As in West Germany,201 a
"public interest" criterion is applied to all compulsory licensing.2 "2
h. The Netherlands. Under these laws, the "patentee is at all
times bound to grant [a] license which may be necessary to enable
a subsequently patented invention to be used."20 The French re-
quirement of "significant technical advance,"' 4 and the Italian re-
quirement of "remarkable improvement of the art, '205 are not re-
flected here. The Netherlands also provides for reciprocal granting
of a license on the improvement to the earlier patentee. 20 1
i. United Kingdom. Once again, the British statute and the stat-
ute for the Republic of Ireland resemble each other closely. 20 7 A
subsequent patentee may obtain a compulsory license from a prior
patentee where the refusal to grant such a license would hinder or
prevent "the working or efficient working in the United Kingdom
of any other patented invention which makes a substantial contri-
bution to the art. '208
The comparative survey of the various national laws of the nine
Member States of the EEC respecting the three primary areas of
compulsory licensing-public interest compulsory licensing, com-
pulsory licensing for non-exploitation or insufficient exploitation,
and compulsory licensing where there are interdependent pat-
ents-indicates the divergent approaches of the various national
systems. To be sure, the exposition reveals similar strains here and
there. However, should the EEC States fail to reach agreement on
common rules and should the Member States exercise their rights
under the CPC "Reservation in respect of compulsory licensing, 20 9
then the application of national law to the Community patent will
be "complementary" but not harmonious. Concomitant distortions
of competition and obstacles to the free movement of goods within
the Common Market could result.
"I See note 193 supra and accompanying text.
1'2 Gredt, Luxembourg: Patent Law, supra note 121, at 2.
m" The Netherlands Patent Law § 34(3), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note
85, at 717.
"' See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
See note 197 supra and accompanying text.
The Netherlands Patent Law § 34(3), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note
85, at 717.
"I See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
41 British Patent Law § 37(2)(a)(d)(ii), cited in LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note
85, at 720, 721.
20 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 89.
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B. National Laws on Patent Infringement and the CPC
The CPC expressly provides for the complementary application
of national law in actions for infringement of the Community pat-
ent, 10 the grant of complementary jurisdiction being preceded by
the principle that the effects of the Community patent are to be
governed solely by the CPC.11 Specifically, the CPC language is
that the "infringement of a Community patent shall be governed by
the National Law in the Contracting State where the court hearing
the action is located" ' unless the State's conflict of law rules call
for the application of the national law of another Contracting
State. 13 Hence, while the CPC achieved centralization of proceed-
ings in Community institutions in actions for revocation and limita-
tion of Community patents, union was not achieved for infringe-
ment actions, which are to remain the preserve of the national
courts .2 1
The Commission of the European Communities was aware that
the CPC's division in jurisdiction concerning patent validity and
patent infringement could cause difficulties.21 5 A completely unified
Community patent regime where all aspects of the Community pat-
ent are regulated by Community institutions would be a better solu-
tion. Presumably a solution will be found which will reinforce the
unitary character of Community patent21 1 in the forthcoming work
pursuant to the Resolution on Centralization of Jurisdiction' 7 and
the Resolution on Litigation of Community patents."8
The possible difficulties which may arise are best illustrated by a
comparative analysis of the applicable national laws on infringe-
ment which will be applied to the Community patent under the
CPC. As mentioned earlier, as a comparative proposition, there are
generally two distinct types of patent systems within the EEC: the
registration, non-examination system, as exemplified, for instance,
by France, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg; and the novelty and
"I Id. arts. 36, 69, para. 2, 79.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
"1 [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771.
21 Commission Opinion of September 26, 1975, on the Draft Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 261) 26, 27 (1975), reprinted in
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9777, at 9724.
218 Id.
217 Resolution on Centralization, supra note 75.
211 Resolution on Litigation, supra note 78.
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subject matter examination system, as exemplified by West Ger-
many and The Netherlands."'9 "In [the former type of system]
• . . a patentee does not know the true scope of his patent until
it has been tested in the courts. On the other hand, [in the latter
type of system] the owner of a German or Dutch patent can sue an
infringer with considerable confidence."2 0 In the former type of pat-
ent system, the issue of patent validity may be reached in an action
for patent infringement. For instance, in France, after a complaint
of infringement has been filed with the tribunal de grande instance,
the infringer must file a brief generally making a counterclaim
which may be based on the validity of the patent at issue.22" ' How-
ever, in the latter type of system, as represented by West Germany,
for example, the court is bound to accept the patent as validly
granted in an infringement suit.2 2 Italy allows for the issue of patent
validity to be reached in an action for infringement. The patentee
benefits from a presumption of validity which the infringer must
overcome by demonstrating invalidity or forfeiture of the patent.2 2 3
Likewise, the courts of the Republic of Ireland12 4 and those of the
United Kingdom22 5 may reach the issue of validity in an infringe-
ment action.
Furthermore, with the existence of these divergent types of patent
systems within the EEC, it behooves industrial interests and inven-
tors to manipulate national law to their own advantage with an eye
to a potential infringement action, as national law will be applied
to the Community patent. For example, "as to infringement, British
claims are very strictly, sometimes unbelievably restrictively con-
strued. There is no doctrine of contributory infringement. There is
no doctrine of equivalence. Infringement requires all elements of the
claim. Because of this British practitioners normally draft very
broad claims." 21 The situation is different in West Germany, how-
"' See notes 66, 67, 68 supra and accompanying text.
m ROBINS, supra note 65, at 164.
22' Weinstein, France: Patent Law, supra note 150, at 6. For the principal French statutes
on infringement see LANG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 956-957B.
m LANG, CoMPARATlVE ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 961.
m Bentivoglio, Italy: Patent Law, supra note 169, at 7, 8.
n' Williams, Ireland: Patent Law, supra note 116, at 9, 10.
Pickering, United Kingdom: Patent Law, supra note 178, at 4.
r2 Littenberg, Recent Developments in the Justice Department and Federal Trade Com-
mission and Patent Office Policies and Practice, in CuRRENT TRENDS IN DOMESTIC AND INTER-
NATIONAL LIcENSING 86 (Patent Transcript Series No. 6, R. Goldschneider & M. Finnegan,
chairmen, 1975).
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ever, where "there is a theory (elementenschutz) that if claim 1 calls
for A B and claim 17 calls for C, the German court can, if it finds
C by itself is patentable, enforce the patent as to C alone." '227 Ac-
cordingly, it has been suggested that United States patent practi-
tioners, for instance, when sending a United States patent or patent
application abroad in order to bring it into accord with local prac-
tice, should send it to Great Britain.22 1 Under the CPC's comple-
mentary territorial application of national law in infringement ac-
tions, however, the same claims could be simultaneously valid and
invalid in different EEC States.
Since the presence of these divergent types of patent systems
within the EEC allows the courts of some Member States to reach
the issue of patent validity in an action for infringement, there
exists the juridical basis for the partial revocation of the Com-
munity patent on grounds of invalidity by the courts of certain
Member States. It is easy to see how a Community patent could be
simultaneously valid and invalid depending on the locus in the
Common Market.2" The CPC solves this problem by providing that
national courts, when applying national law in a complementary
fashion in an action for infringement of a Community patent "shall
treat the patent as valid. ' '2 30
If the CPC stopped at the statement that the national courts, in
dealing with the Community patent, shall treat it as valid, the CPC
would be a more remarkable step towards the economic and
politico-legal integration of Europe. Indeed, such a statement uni-
fies two distinct types of national legal regimes for dealing with
patent infringement, eliminating the specter of possible simultane-
ous validity and invalidity or partial territorial revocation of the
Community patent within the EEC. However, against the better
advice of the Commission of the European Communities, 2 3' the
Plenipotentiaries incorporated a "Reservation in respect of in-
fringement proceedings, ' '232 which provides that notwithstanding
V Id.
= Id.
2 Note 215 supra.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 76 (emphasis added).
' Commission Opinion of September 26, 1975, on the Draft Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 261) 26 (1975), reprinted in
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9777, at 9723-27.
2 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 90.
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the rule that national courts should treat the Community patent as
valid, 33
any Contracting State whose national law makes provision for a
decision to be taken in infringement proceedings as to the validity
of national patents may. . .[reserve] the right to provide that its
courts dealing with infringement relating to a Community patent
may. . .decide upon the effect of the Community patent in the
territory of the State in which the court is located.2 34
Where a court of a Member State has decided that the Community
patent is ineffective, "[t]he Community patent shall not have ef-
fect in the territory of a contracting State which has made a reser-
vation. '13 5 National procedures are to be applied when the national
court adjudicates the issue of the validity'of a Community patent.236
Furthermore, the reservation may be made for a period of up to 15
years. 237 Hence, the complementary application of the national laws
and the two distinct types of patent infringement systems to the
Community patent may have a potentially long-term vitality. In
brief, "[a] derogation may be made for a maximum of fifteen years
from the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the departments
of the European Patent Office [in Munich] as regards the validity
of the community patent."213
As is evident, this reservation runs counter to one of the funda-
mental principles of the CPC,2 39 whereby the Community patent has
the same effect in all the EEC States.2 0 An earlier draft of the CPC
had provided that the European Patent Office would have sole
jurisdiction to cancel the Community patent with effect for all the
Member States.24' The Reservation contravenes the fundamental
principles of the creation of a common system of law for the CPC,2 1
wherein the Community patent is to have unitary23 and autono-
m Id. art. 76.
1' Id. art. 90, para. 1.
2u Id. para. 2.
231 Id. para. 2.
237 Id. para. 4.
23 [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771.
Community Patent Conference Under Way, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9786, at 9751.
240 Id.
211 Commission Opinion of September 26, 1975, on the Draft Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 261) 26 (1975), reprinted in
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 9777, at 9723.
21 Id. at 27, 8724; Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
2, Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 2.
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mous24 character with equal effect throughout the EEC. 2 ' As the
Commission observed, such a contravention "creates obstacles to
the free movement of patented goods and to the creation of equal
conditions of competition and also is at variance with the principle
of the 'free movement' of judgments under the Convention on Juris-
diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters."24 6
As the comparative analysis of the two distinct types of national
patent systems within the EEC indicates, the complementary appli-
cation of national law in actions for infringement of the Community
patent could produce effects retrogressive to economic and politico-
legal integration-a fortiori if some of the EEC States exercise the
Reservation and rule on the validity of the Community patent.
IV. CONTROLLING THE COMPLEMENTARY APPLICATION OF DIVERSE
NATIONAL LAWS To THE COMMUNITY PATENT THROUGH CPC
PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS
Having analyzed the Community patent from the standpoints of
an international, contextual history and a comparative analysis of
the applicable national laws in the areas of compulsory licensing
and infringements, it is evident that the application of national laws
to the Community patent may not be "complementary." Though
the CPC as a whole represents a document reflective of the integra-
tive principles of the Rome Treaty, the quality of the unification
achieved by the CPC is not the thoroughgoing one necessary for
complete economic and politico-legal integration. Granted that the
application of national law in actions respecting compulsory licens-
ing or the infringement of the Community patent could have retro-
gressive or disintegrative effects, the question at this point becomes
that of how to avoid or minimize such effects within the procedural
regime established by the CPC.
As a general proposition, the CPC embodies several provisions
designed to minimize disintegrative effects. First, where the CPC
",, Id. para. 3.
"1 Id. para. 2.
.. Commission Opinion of September 26, 1975, on the Draft Convention for the European
Patent for the Common Market, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 261) 26, 27 (1975), reprinted in
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9777, at 9724; Convention on Juris-
diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
reprinted in [1968] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 6001-70 [hereinafter cited as Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement].
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comes into conflict with provisions of the Rome Treaty, 47 the Rome
Treaty has precedence. 8 Second, the CPC confers certain jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Justice of the European Communities to deal
with actions respecting the Community patent. 49 With regard to
proceedings for compulsory licensing and patent infringement
which are brought before national courts of EEC Member States,
the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rul-
ings on the interpretation of the CPC, 50 the interpretation of the
provisions of the CPC25' binding on every Community patent in
accordance with the CPC, 52 and the validity and interpretation of
the implementing provisions of the CPC25 3 enacted pursuant to it. 54
This last area of the EEC Court's competence is limited, however,
by language excluding national implementing provisions. 25 Such
provisions constitute a mandate for the Court of Justice to issue
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the CPC whether or not
requested to do so by the national courts. In addition, where a
question of CPC interpretation is raised before a national court, that
court may request a ruling from the European Court where such a
ruling from the European Court is necessary to enable the national
court to give judgment.2 .
These general safeguards, taken by themselves, are not enough
where the complementary application of national law is mandated;
hence, the specific procedural safeguards to ensure uniformity of
result should be examined both in the areas of compulsory licensing
and patent infringement. First, with regard to compulsory licensing,
as discussed earlier, the EEC States covenanted by Resolution 57 to
promulgate common rules to govern this subject upon signing the
CPC. Although the "Reservation on compulsory licensing '2 8 sus-
pends the crucial articles encouraging the free movement of goods
"' Rome Treaty, supra note 2.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 93.
Id. arts. 5, 73.
11 Id. art. 73, para. 1, subpara. (a).
"I European Patent Convention, supra note 6.
2 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 3, art. 73, para. 1, subpara.
(a).
211 Id. art. 73, para. 1, subpara. (b).
"' Id. art. 92.
Id. art. 73, para. 1, subpara. (b).
25S Id. art. 73, para. 2
"I See note 70 supra.
Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 89.
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where compulsory licensing is contemplated for non-exploitation, 59
the language of the Reservation provides for its own automatic ter-
mination when the common rules take effect.260 Further, the CPC,
to encourage uniformity in the complementary application of na-
tional compulsory licensing law, provides that "[a]s far as practic-
able national authorities shall notify the European Patent Office of
the grant of any compulsory license in respect of a Community
patent." 2 '
Second, with regard to infringement, the CPC added detail to and
supplemented the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.26 2 Specif-
ically, the CPC prescribes the courts before which actions for in-
fringement of the Community patent may be heard.2 13 Uniform ju-
risdictional priorities in infringement actions are established in the
following order: (1) the court where the defendant infringer has his
residence; (2) failing that, the court where plaintiff patentee has his
residence; or (3) failing both, the courts of the Federal Republic of
Germany.2 4 In addition, "actions for infringement may also be
heard before the courts of the Contracting State in which an act of
infringement was committed. ' 26 5 One particular safeguard where
the issue of validity is raised in an action for infringement in a
national court is provided by the CPC. Where a decision depends
on the patentability of the invention, the national court must stay
the proceedings pending an opinion by the European Patent Office
on the extent of protection conferred by the patent.2 6 Further, in
certain circumstances, a national court may stay the proceedings
relating to the Community patent, insofar as its decision depends
upon validity.6 " In such case, a Revocation Board of the European
Patent Office shall issue an opinion to the national court on the
extent of protection under the patent.26 8
"I Id. arts. 47, 81.
20 Id. art. 89, para. 3.
"I Id. art. 46, para. 3.
"2 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, supra note 246; [1976] 2 CoMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9797, at 9771; Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, arts. 69, 70, 71.
263 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 69; [1976] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
9797, at 9771.
261 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 69, para. 1.
2"5 Id. para. 2.
2" Id. art. 77, para. 1.
267 Id.
2M Id. art. 78.
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The provisions of the CPC discussed above which trigger the oper-
ation of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments2" are of cardinal significance regarding the institution of
actions for infringement.270 The action need only be brought once
before the court at the infringer's place of residence, even where the
acts of infringement occurred in several Member States.27' Further-
more, "[tihe judgment in infringement cases is recognized in prin-
ciple in all the Member States and can be enforced in simplified
proceedings even outside the State in which it was delivered. ' '1 2
Finally, it should be emphasized that the CPC provides the jurid-
ical basis for the unification of the distinct types of patent systems
in the Common Market by providing that the national courts shall
treat the patent as valid in actions for infringement.2 17 However, as
discussed above, the Reservation in respect of infringement ac-
tions2 4 abrogates this provision, thereby permitting the partial terri-
torial revocation of the Community patent within the EEC and the
simultaneous validity and invalidity discussed above.
In fine, though the CPC provides some means for controlling the
complementary application of diverse national laws on compulsory
licensing and infringement, the presence of the two respective Re-
servations2 5 as integral parts of the CPC undercuts the unifying
effect of these provisions. The four Resolutions26 addressing these
problems, made a part of the Final Act of the Plenipotentiaries at
the Luxembourg Conference, underscore the need for additional
supplemental actions to ensure that the application of national law
to the Community patent in the compulsory licensing and infringe-
ment contexts indeed will be "complementary."
V. CONCLUSION
The analytical trek through the contextual history of the Com-
munity patent, the comparative analysis of "complementary" na-
tional laws under the CPC to the areas of compulsory licensing and
patent infringement, in the context of controlling the complemen-
"' Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, supra note 246.
27 [1975-1976] Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 9786, at 9752.
vi Id.
2 Id.
"3 Community Patent Convention, supra note 4, art. 76.
' Id. art. 90.
' Id. arts. 89, 90.
" See notes 59, 70, 75, and 78 supra and accompanying text.
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tary application of diverse national laws through CPC procedural
mechanisms, has made several conclusions possible concerning the
CPC and the complementary application of national law to the
Community patent.
First, although the CPC constitutes a significant step along the
way to the complete economic and politico-legal integration of Eu-
rope through its creation of a unitary patent law for the EEC, it does
not constitute the thoroughgoing unification necessary to avoid pos-
sible retrogressive effects upon the free movement of patented prod-
ucts within the EEC and upon equal Market-wide conditions for
competition. Provisions calling for the complementary application
of divergent national laws to a juridical creature of the European
Community perpetuate the principle of territoriality.
Second, as the comparative analysis of the national compulsory
licensing law of the nine EEC Member States indicates, there is
great divergency within the Community in three primary areas:
compulsory licensing in the interest of public health, security or
defense; compulsory licensing for the non-exploitation or insuffi-
cient exploitation of patents; and compulsory licensing where there
are interdependent patents. As indicated, the application of this
divergent body of law to the Community patent may produce effects
which are contraposed to the integrative process.
Third, as revealed by the comparative analysis of the various
types of patent systems in the EEC and their treatment of patent
infringement, the complementary application of national infringe-
ment law to the Community patent on the basis of territoriality will
create unequal conditions of competition in the various EEC states.
This is especially true where the issue of patent validity is reached
in the national infringement action. The specter of simultaneous
validity and invalidity of the Community patent is raised.
Fourth, the CPC contains various procedural mechanisms and
provisions which will tend to promote intra-Community uniformity
in both compulsory licensing and infringement actions. Preliminary
rulings by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in
certain cases as discussed and the applicability of the Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, effective for most EEC Member States February
1, 1973, are especially helpful.
Fifth, as the Reservation on Compulsory Licenses and the Reser-
vation in Respect of Infringement Proceedings demonstrate, the
achievement of the CPC was a political battle between the forces
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representing domestic industrial policies of particular Member
States and the forces in favor of promoting the economic and
politico-legal integration of Europe through the creation of a unitary
patent system. Through exercising these Reservations, Member
States can undermine the unitary nature of the Community patent
in both the compulsory licensing and infringement contexts for a
period of up to 15 years. The exercise of these Reservations by Mem-
ber States will reflect their commitment to mercantile policies
rather than the goals of the CPC and the principles of the Rome
Treaty.
Sixth, as the four Resolutions discussed in the inquiry strongly
suggest, there is a great deal of unfinished business for the EEC
Member States if the goal of a thoroughgoing unitary patent system
for the Common Market is to be achieved. Working Groups espe-
cially will work on the adjustment and approximation of national
patent laws, the development of common rules to be applied by the
Member States to the compulsory licensing of the Community pat-
ent, and the development of common standards to guide the litiga-
tion of the Community patent in the courts of the various EEC
States, particularly in infringement actions. Such action will be
necessary to supplement the CPC in order that the complementary
application of national laws to compulsory licensing and infringe-
ment of the Community patent will not generate results which will
be counterproductive to the economic and politico-legal integrative
process through the creation of obstacles to the free movement of
patented products within the EEC and the correlative intra-
Community distortions of competition.
Our arrival at the end of the disquisition necessitates that our
initial question be posed again: can the application of national laws
to the Community patent be "complementary" to the Luxembourg
Convention on the Community Patent? The answer to this funda-
mental question is a "qualified yes," and work remains to be done
to remove that qualification.
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